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Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act: Recent Amendments
The Food Additives Amendment of 1958 and the Color
Additive Amendment of 1960 significantly expand the
role of government in the food, drug, and cosmetic in-
dustries. The author of this Note discusses the reasons
leading to the enactment of this legislation, describes the
mechanics of its operation, and examines some of the re-
sulting administrative problems. He concludes that while
the Amendments were necessary, certain changes in lan-
guage and administration are required if their original ob-
jectives are to be realized.
INTRODUCTION
In 1946, a frozen food packer discovered that thiourea, a chem-
ical, would retard the growth of mold on peaches while improving
their color. Without further investigation, he applied thiourea to a
batch of his peaches. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA),
by a fortuity, learned of the packer's thiourea treatment before
the peaches were shipped. It fed a sample of the treated peaches
to laboratory rats. The following morning the rats were dead.'
The extensive use of substances, such as thiourea, in foods,
drugs, and cosmetics-a development occurring near the end of
World War II-allowed industry to utilize new production and
marketing techniques.2 This development also benefited the con-
1. The purpose of this description is to illustrate the chemical additive
problem, not to deliver a precise, accurate, factual rendition of the thi-
ourea incident. In fact the "story" varies with each source reporting the in-
cident. See Delaney, Peril on Your Food Shelf, American Magazine, July
1951, p. 18; Brecher, The Chemicals We Eat, Nation, June 23, 1951, p.
584; see also H.R. REP. No. 2356, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1952).
2. A United Nations committee, comprised of members from both the
Foreign Agriculture and the World Health Organization issued a report on
the use of additives in foods in 1956. For the purpose of this report, "food
additives" were defined as "nonnutritive substances added intentionally to
food, generally in small quantities, to improve its appearance, flavor, tex-
ture, or storage properties." The report explains that additives perform a
variety of beneficial functions and enumerates four technical purposes
for their use. Food additives should be used: (1) to maintain the nutrition-
al quality of food, (2) to enhance stability and reduce wastage of food, (3)
to improve the appearance of food, and (4) to aid in food processing.
Report of the Joint FAQ!WHO Committee on Food Additives: General
Principles Governing the Use of Food Additives 4, 6-8 (1956).
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sumer. As the thiourea incident suggests, however, these advan-
tages were sometimes accompanied by adverse and dangerous side
effects.' Though not required to do so, most processors were
prudent enough to pretest these substances before distribution and
to market only those which would not endanger the consumer."
However, an irresponsible minority continued to market products
which contained untested additives. The dangers created by this
practice, though infrequent, did not escape congressional scru-
tiny. While Congress was aware of the advantages additives made
available to industry, it was most concerned with the inadequate
consumer protection provided by the 1938 Food, Drug, and Cos-
metic Act.5 In 1950 Congress formed the Delaney committee to
investigate the use of chemicals in food products with a view to-
ward determining whether new legislation was needed to provide
more adequate consumer protection and, simultaneously, to facili-
tate progress in food technology.
The activities of the Delaney committee stimulated an active in-
terest in the additive problem-at least among contributors to pop-
ular magazines. Many articles published in a variety of maga-
zines favored new legislation.6 Usually, by stressing the failure of
the 1938 Act to require pretesting and by recapitulating occur-
rences such as the thiourea incident, these articles advocated in-
creased regulation, including mandatory pretesting, of all addi-
tives. A typical contributor was the committee's chairman, Rep-
resentative James J. Delaney. In 1951 he wrote:
Our food supply is being doctored by hundreds of new chemicals
whose safety has not yet been established ...
3. The United Nations committee, see note 2 supra, also enumerated four
purposes for which food additives should not be used: (1) to disguise the
use of faulty processing and handling techniques, (2) to deceive consumers
as to quality of the product, (3) to reduce foods' nutritive value, and (4)
to substitute for sound, economically feasible, manufacturing practices.
Id. at 9-10.
4. Peters, The Scientific Significance of the Amendment to the Food-
Manufacturing Industry, 13 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 800 (1958); Rankin,
Establishing Tolerances for Food Additives, 13 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 641,
644 (1958).
5. H.R. REP. No. 2284, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958); S. REP. No. 2422,
85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958); 104 CoNG. Rnc. 17412-24 (1958).
6. See, e.g., Delaney, Peril on Your Food Shelf, American Magazine,
June 1951, p. 18; Tighter Food & Drug Law, Business Week, Feb. 23, 1952,
p. 162; Consumer Reports, July 1951, p. 326; Brecher, The Chemicals
We Eat, Nation, June 23, 1951, p. 584; Need Laws to Guard Food, Science
News Letter, Nov. 19, 1949, p. 327. Contra, Dunbar, Are Chemicals
Poisoning Our Food?, Today's Health, Oct. 1952, p. 39. See also Gosnell,
Food-Additive Legislation-A Review of Fundamentals, 12 FOOD DRUG
CosM. L.J. 369, 370-71 (1957).
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This potentially lethal situation is due to a curious loophole in our
present laws-a tragic legal joker that permits us to become a nation
of 150,000,000 guinea pigs guilelessly testing out chemicals that should
have been tested adequately before they reached our kitchen shelves.7
Some alteration of the 1938 Act was clearly necessary. That this
need was as urgent as Delaney and others suggested, however,
was not clear. Those who expressed opposition to basic alteration
of the 1938 Act insisted that advocates of more regulation were
alarmists exaggerating the danger of chemical additives.8 These
writers argued that with food scarcity fast becoming a real global
threat, legislation requiring pretesting would be cumbersome and
would substantially impede the one industry most in need of en-
couragement.
This Note will examine two recent amendments to the 1938
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act-the Food Additives Amend-
ment of 19589 and the Color Additive Amendment of 1960.1°
The object of this Note is to discuss the Amendments' significant
provisions, the mechanics of their operation, and several contro-
versial problems they present. Generally, these Amendments rep-
resent an effort to adjust the 1938 Act to the advent of chemical
additives. They also demonstrate that the objectives of the original
congressional committee-to provide more adequate consumer
protection and to facilitate progress in food technology-are not
entirely compatible.
I. DEFECTS IN THE 1938 ACT
The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938,11 though fre-
quently amended, has retained much of its original vitality and
still provides the framework for all food, drug, and cosmetic law.
It is often referred to as the "basic act."
A. INADEQAUTE CONSUMER PROTECTION
1. Food Additives
In 1958 adherents of the Delaney view persuaded Congress that
the 1938 Act failed to provide the consumer with adequate pro-
7. Delaney, supra note 6, at 19, 112. (Italics in original.) Delaney did
incidently concede that many large firms pretested additives without
being required to do so.
8. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 2356, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 34-
39, pt. 2, at 1-6 (1952) (minority report); Dunbar, Are Chemicals Poison-
ing Our Food?, Today's Health, Oct. 1952, p. 39.
9. 72 Stat. 1784 (1958) (codified in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
10. 74 Stat. 397 (1960) (codified in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
11. 52 Stat. 1040 (1938), as amended, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-92 (1958).
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tection from dangerous food additives. 2 They based their argu-
ments on two related facts which, in isolation, provided rather
persuasive evidence of the inadequacy of the 1938 Act. 3 (1) The
Act did not ordinarily allow the FDA to reach dangerous additives
until sold or consumed. (2) The Act required the FDA to sus-
tain the burden of proving that a particular additive was, in fact,
unsafe. Actually, to the extent that the FDA could inspect fac-
tories'" and obtain injunctions, 5 additives could be "reached"
prior to distribution. But the availability of either of these enforce-
ment tools did not dispense with the arguments based on the
FDA's burden of proof because neither would be sought without
some reason to suspect a violation. Two arguments were advanced
to support the position that the FDA's burden of proof resulted
in insufficient consumer protection. First, it was difficult to mar-
shal sufficient evidence; testing of additives suspected as unsafe
often took as long as two years and, in the meantime, the addi-
tive's use continued. 16 Second, cases were often tried by a lay
jury; the FDA ran the risk of the jury's failure to comprehend
the technical evidence required to establish a violation of the act.'
Despite the Delaney position, a consideration of the practi-
calities of the food industry itself suggests that the 1938 Act may
have provided adequate consumer protection. Food suppliers have
always depended on favorable publicity and a readily available
market for their products. Their margin between financial success
and failure has always been tenuous. Therefore, they could ill af-
ford adverse publicity resulting from either injury to consumers
12. See note 5 supra.
13. See Rankin, Establishing Tolerances for Food Additives, 13 FooD
DRUG CosM. L.J. 641 (1958); Larrick, The New Food-Additives Law, 13
FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 634 (1958); Dunn, The Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act of the United States, 13 FooD DRUG COSM. L.J. 407 (1958).
14. Section 704, 52 Stat. 1057 (1938), as amended, 21 U.S.C. § 374(1958). It is estimated that 80% of the violations of the act have been de-
tected by this method. Hearings before the Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce on H.R. 2769, HR. 3551 and H.R. 3604, 83d Cong.,
lst Sess. 2 (1953).
15. Section 302, 52 Stat. 1043 (1938), as amended, 21 U.S.C. § 332(1958).
16. See 104 CONG. REc. 17413-14 (1958); Rankin, Establishing Toler-
ances for Food Additives, 13 FoOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 641 (1958).
17. See Dunn, The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of the United
States, 13 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 407, 412 (1958). The FDA was allowed
only 25 dollars per day for expert witnesses. It has been argued that this
weak bargaining position increased the FDA's disadvantage in the court
room. See Harvey, Administration of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,
10 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 441, 443 (1955). However, the availability of
government experts in the FDA itself would seem to have minimized this
burden.
or enforcement'8 of the 1938 Act. That Act, which primarily
sought to prevent adulteration and misbranding of food, 9 was en-
forceable through seizure,20 injunction,2' fine,22 and imprison-
ment.23 Thus, notwithstanding the FDA's inability to reach de-
fective goods prior to sale or consumption, it might be argued that
the threat imposed by potential civil liability and the FDA's arsenal
of civil and criminal sanctions may have resulted in sufficient
consumer protection.
Even assuming that the various sanctions imposed a sufficient
threat to the producer, it did not necessarily follow that the 1938
Act provided adequate consumer protection.24 To the extent that
the Act's regulatory scheme in fact operated as a deterrent, only
willful violations were curtailed. The 1938 Act itself, which re-
quired no proof of criminal intent to establish a violation,' sug-
gested that the food industry was peculiarly susceptible to the inno-
cent misuse of innovations. The thiourea incident demonstrates
that the use of food additives is such an innovation; therefore, the
real justification for the additional consumer protection provided
by the Food Additives Amendment would seem to lie in the threat
posed by the likelihood of innocent violations.
2. Color Additives
Since the 1938 Act failed to recognize that natural colors are
as hazardous, potentially, as synthetic (coal-tar) 26 colors, there
was little dispute over the need for more adequate consumer pro-
18. For a thorough discussion of administrative and judicial enforcement
of the 1938 Act, see Developments in the Law, The Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act, 67 HARv. L. REv. 632, 673-722 (1954).
19. Id. at 640-59.
20. Section 304, 52 Stat. 1044 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 334 (1958).
21. Section 302, 52 Stat. 1043 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 332 (1958).
22. Section 303, 52 Stat. 1043 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 334 (1958).
23. Ibid.
24. In fact much of the evidence accumulated by the congressional
committee tended to show that consumer health was inadequately protect-
ed. See Hearings Before the House Select Committee to Investigate the Use
of Chemicals in Food Products, 82d Cong., 1st & 2d Sess., pts. 1-4
(1952); Hearings Before the House Select Committee to Investigate the Use
of Chemicals in Food Products, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950).
25. See § 301, 52 Stat. 1042 (1938), as amended, 21 U.S.C. § 331
(1958); see also Developments in the Law, The Federal Food, Drug, And
Cosmetic Act, 67 HARv. L. REv. 632, 694-96 (1954).
26.
The term "coal-tar color" has been interpreted to apply not only
to substances which are coal-tar derivatives but also to synthetic sub-
stances so related in their chemical structure to a coal-tar constituent
as to be capable of derivation therefrom even when not actually so
derived.
H.R. REP. No. 1761, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1960).
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tection from dangerous color additives. A coal-tar color was not
permitted in foods, drugs, or cosmetics unless it originated from
a "batch" certified as safe after pretesting; products containing
noncertified coal-tar colors were deemed adulterated.2" On the
other hand, there were no pretesting or certification require-
ments for the use of natural colors.2 As a result, products polluted
by dangerous natural colors could only be reached through the
general adulteration provisions in the basic act.
B. TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS THREATENED-THE "HARMLESS
PER SE" CONCEPT
Despite the fact that mandatory pretesting of additives was a
concededly expensive proposition, many of the industries which
would be affected supported the proposed additives legislation.29
Certainly the more responsible elements, which had pretested ad-
ditives before the enactment of the statutory mandate, were anxious
to see their competitors bear this expense. But the primary reason
for industry's support appears to have been the FDA's inflexible
administration of the. 1938 Act's adulteration provisions. Because
of judicial construction of the previous law, the Food and Drug
Act of 1906, this problem was virtually non-existent prior to 1938.
With the passage of the 1938 Act, however, the FDA developed
the "harmless per se" concept which threatened to impede the
technological progress made possible by the use of additives. Un-
der this standard, which was neither compelled by the language
of the 1938 Act nor essential to adequate consumer protection, the
use of any poisonous additive was absolutely prohibited even
though it would be entirely safe and, perhaps, extremely bene-
ficial at its ordinarily low level of use. Since many additives not
"harmless per se" can facilitate progress in technology and even
27. See The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, ch. 675, §§ 402(c),
501(a)(4), 601(e), 52 Stat. 1047, 1049, 1054 (1938). See also Becker,
Courts and Food Colors, 14 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 330 (1959).
28.
It is unscientific also to differentiate between a natural source and a
synthetic source of the same substance in determining whether or not
such substance should be exempt from regulatory rules. All color ad-
ditives should be proven harmless under conditions of intended
use ....
Sherwood, Scientific Problems under the Food-Additives Amendment, Il-
lustrated by Color and Flavor Additives, 13 FooD DRuG CosM. L.J. 804,
808 (1958). See also Color-Additive Amendments of 1960, 15 FoOD DRUG
COSM. L.J. 432, 436-37 (1960).
29. See 104 CONG. REc. 17413-14 (1958); H.R. REP. No. 2284, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1958); S. REP. No. 2422, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1958).
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protect public health, new additives legislation was justified even
if more consumer protection were unnecessary.
1. Food Additives
The 1906 Food and Drug law prohibited the use of all food
products containing "any added poisonous or other added ingredi-
ent which [might] . . . render such article injurious to health."30
In United States v. Lexington Mill & Elev. Co.,3 the Supreme
Court construed this adulteration clause as applying only to those
substances with the established capacity to injure consumers. It
overturned the government's condemnation of a "lot" of flour con-
taining an added poisonous ingredient on the ground that the
flour was not adulterated because the minute quantity added did
not endanger the health of consumers.
The language of the 1938 Act seemed to permit a continuation
of the Lexington Mill approach to food additives. The adulteration
provision was almost identical to the analogous provision in the
1906 Act; it prohibited the sale of all foods "[bearing or contain-
ing] any poisonous or deleterious substance which may render it
injurious to health. '32 Section 406(a) 33 purported to permit,
within established tolerances, the use of hazardous additives when
required in food production or when unavoidable by good manu-
facturing practice. Yet Lexington Mill was abandoned by the FDA
and replaced by the unscientific "harmless per se" concept.34 For
two reasons section 406 (a) did not mitigate the effect of this harsh
principle. First, the FDA interpreted the conditional test of section
406(a) so stringently that prior to 1954 a tolerance regulation
was promulgated for only one substance.35 Second, from the
FDA's standpoint resort to section 406(a) was barred after the
"Pesticide Chemicals" Amendment was enacted in 1954.3" This
section was originally designed to accommodate the frequent pres-
30. Food and Drug Act of 1906, ch. 3915, § 7, 34 Stat. 769.
31. 232 U.S. 399 (1914).
32. The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, ch. 675, § 402(a) (1),
52 Stat. 1046 (1938). This provision differed from the analogous provision
in the 1906 Act in that it allowed the Commissioner to declare a food prod-
uct adulterated if it bore or contained a poisonous or deleterious sub-
stance; he was no longer limited to those articles to which the hazardous
substance had been added. This distinction has no bearing on the character
of the substance that will adulterate an article.
33. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, ch. 675, § 406(a), 52 Stat.
1049 (1938). The present § 406 is identical to § 406(a) of the 1938 Act;
the other subdivisions in the original § 406 have been repealed.
34. DuNN, LEGISLATIVE RECORD OF 1958 FOOD ADDrrIVES AMEND-
MENT TO FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT at x (1938).
35. See 2 CCH FOOD DRUG CosM. L. REP. 3063.01 (1961).
36. Ibid. See also DUNN, op. cit. supra note 34.
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ence of pesticide chemical residues in natural foods and the 1954
amendment provided for the establishment of tolerance levels for
these residues.
2. Color Additives
Prior to Flemming v. Florida Citrus Exch.,37 there was a dis-
pute whether the "per se" rule applied to the use of color addi-
tives."8 It was argued in that case that either Lexington Mill or
section 406(a) permitted, at safe levels, the use of a poisonous
coal-tar color in oranges." The Supreme Court, however, approv-
ed the FDA's contention that a coal-tar color batch could not be
certified unless "harmless per se" because the act required that the
safeness of an additive was to be determined without regard to its
effect on the health of consumers. After Florida Citrus, the FDA
commenced a retesting program which led to the discovery that
many colors listed as "harmless" were in fact toxic when highly
concentrated." Thus, applying the "harmless per se" test, there was
a distinct possibility that many beneficial coloring agents would be
decertified by the FDA. This possibility was, undoubtedly, disturb-
ing both to Congress and to industry.
If. THE AMENDMENTS
A. EFFECT OF THE AmENDMENTS ON PRE-1958 LAW
The Food Additives Amendment of 1958 and the Color Addi-
tive Amendment of 1960, each in fact a series of amendments to
37. 358 U.S. 153 (1958), 1 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 112 (1959).
38. Cf. Dohl, Color Additives-Their Regulation, 14 FOOD DRUG
CosM. L.J. 717 (1959); Schramm, Color Additives-Proposed Amend-
ments, 14 FooD DRUG COSM. L.J. 708 (1959); Becker, Courts and Food
Colors, 14 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 330 (1959).
39. Flemming v. Florida Citrus Exch., 358 U.S. 153, 157-62, 165
(1958). See Brief for Respondents other than Frank R. Schell, pp. 32-45.
Though the argument based on § 406(a) would produce an eminently
sensible result, it is difficult to accept analytically. Section 406(a) dealt
generally with substances added to food out of industrial necessity. See text
accompanying note 33 supra. Section 406(b) dealt expressly with coal-tar
colors; it provided that "the Secretary shall promulgate regulations pro-
viding for the listing of coal-tar colors which are harmless and suitable
for use in food . . . ." (Emphasis added.) 52 Stat. 1049 (1938). Most
likely this latter subsection was intended to remove coal-tar colors from
§ 406(a).
40. See H.R. REP. No. 1761, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1960). This re-
testing program may have provided one reason for the FDA's approval of
the Color Additives measure. To remove a color from the certified list,
the FDA had to establish its toxicity with extensive laboratory tests; to re-
test the entire list might have taken 20 years. 2 CCH FooD DRUG COSM.
L. REP. 3644 (1960).
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the basic act, significantly change both the policy and substance of
food, drug, and cosmetic law.
First, two fundamental policy changes may be isolated. (1) In-
stead of requiring the FDA to prove that an additive is in fact
unsafe, these Amendments shift the entire burden of proof to in-
dustry. The producer must now establish, pursuant to pretesting
requirements, the safeness of potentially unsafe additives before
placing them on the market."' (2) Except for the Delaney anti-
cancer clauses which preclude the use of any additive found to in-
duce cancer in man or animal regardless of the concentration re-
quired to induce the disease, the unrealistic "harmless per se"
principle has been eliminated and replaced by the more flexible
"safety in use" principle. The Secretary of Health, Education, and
Welfare is permitted to establish, by regulation, tolerance levels and
other restrictions as to the use of additives. Once an additive's
use is sanctioned through this procedure, that substance will not
"adulterate," within the meaning of the basic act, a food, drug, or
cosmetic product.42
Second, two changes are made in the substantive provisions of
the basic act. (1) The Amendments shift the burden of proof to
industry; they provide that all untested substances which qualify
under the definitions of "food" or "color" additive' are unsafe. 44
Parties desiring to use these substances must assume the burden of
establishing their safeness. To implement this change, the Amend-
ments enlarge the statutory test for an adulterated food, drug, or
cosmetic so as to include those articles affected by "unsafe" ad-
ditives.45 (2) The Amendments adopt the "safety in use" prin-
ciple by establishing standards and procedures for determining
41. Any person holding a written guarantee of an additive's safety
gains immunity from a few of the sanctions of the basic act. In most cases,
however, he would be wise to pretest the additive even in this situation.
See § 303(c), 52 Stat. 1043 (1938), as amended, 21 U.S.C. § 333(c)(1958); 2 CCH FoOD DRuG CosM. L. REP. 3572, 6327 (1960).
42. Cf. § 402(a)(2) (A), 74 Stat. 397-98, 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(2) (A)
(Supp. II, 1960).
43. The definition of "food additive" differs from the definition of "col-
or additive" in one controversial respect. The Color Additive Amendment
does not exempt from its provisions substances generally recognized as safe
("GRAS"). Compare § 201(s), added by, 72 Stat. 1784 (1958), as amended,
21 U.S.C. § 321(s) (Supp. II, 1960) (quoted note 52 infra), with § 201(t),
added by 74 Stat. 397, 21 U.S.C. § 321(t) (Supp. II, 1960) (quoted note
60 infra). See notes 65-71 infra and accompanying text.
44. Food Additives Amendment of 1958, §§ 201(s), 409(a), 72 Stat.
1784, 1785, as amended, 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(s), 348(a) (Supp. II, 1960);
Color Additive Amendments of 1960, §§ 201(t), 706(a), 74 Stat. 397, 399,
21 U.S.C. §§ 321(t), 376 (Supp. II, 1960).
45. Section 402, 52 Stat. 1046 (1938) (amended by 72 Stat. 1784
(1958) and 74 Stat. 397 (1960)), 21 U.S.C. § 342 (Supp. 11, 1960).
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whether an additive is safe or unsafe under the conditions of its
intended use.46 The Secretary may, on his own initiative, issue a
regulation which permits an additive's use under certain toler-
ances and other restrictions. If the Secretary does not exercise
this power, the party desiring to use the additive must petition for
such a regulation. This party must first thoroughly pretes4
the additive in question; then the petition, usually together with a
sample of the additive, is filed with the FDA. This petition de-
scribes the intended use of the additive, its qualities, and the testing
procedures utilized to secure the data which purport to establish its
safety. The petition also recommends the appropriate restrictions
as to quantity (tolerances) and methods with which the additive
may be safely used. When considering the petition, the Secretary
must determine whether the petitioner has proven that no harm
will result from the proposed use of the additive.4" Where the
petition is adequate the Secretary will publish, in the Federal Reg-
ister, a regulation which proposes to permit the use of the additive
in question within the recommended tolerances and other restric-
tions. Parties "adversely affected" by either the proposed regula-
tion or by the denial of the petition, may file objections with the
Secretary requesting a public hearing.49 If no hearing is requested,
the Secretary publishes the proposed regulation in the Code of
Federal Regulations as a final order. If a hearing is requested, the
Secretary examines the record of this hearing before publishing the
final order. At this point parties "adversely affected"5 by the
46. Compare § 409, added by, 72 Stat. 1785 (1958), 21 U.S.C. § 348
(Supp. II, 1960), with § 706, added by 74 Stat. 399, 21 U.S.C. § 376
(Supp. II, 1960). "The term 'safe,' as used . . . in sections 409 and 706,
has reference to the health of man or animal." Section 201(u), added by
72 Stat. 1784 (1958), 21 U.S.C. § 321(u) (Supp. II, 1960). This, of course,
allows the Secretary to utilize, in framing regulations, data accumulated
in tests conducted with laboratory animals.
47. Precedent for these predistribution controls is found in § 408 (Pes-
ticide Chemicals Amendment) and § 505 ("new drug" provision) of the
basic act. See also the Meat Inspection Act, 34 Stat. 674 (1907), 21 U.S.C.
§§ 71-91 (1958).
48. For a detailed analysis of the criteria applied by the Secretary in
evaluating petitions, see Rankin, Establishing Tolerances for Food Addi-
tives, 13 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 641, 645 (1958). See also 2 CCH FooD
DRUG CosM. L. REP. 3562 (1960).
49. The petitioner's trade secrets, which are often contained of necessity
in his detailed petition, are protected under § 301(j), 52 Stat. 1042, as
amended, 21 U.S.C. § 331(j) (Supp. II, 1960), only until he requests a pub-
lic hearing. Since many additives are in fact beneficial to the consumer, it
does not seem unreasonable to suggest that some procedural alteration be
made to allow producers to prove the safety and utility of questionable ad-
ditives at these hearings without sacrificing trade secrets.
50. Which parties qualify as "adversely affected" under the Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act is not clear. See Reade v. Ewing, 205 F.2d 630 (2d
942
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Secretary's decision may appeal to a court of appeals; there the
Secretary's order will be sustained if based on a "fair evaluation of
the entire record.""1
B. THE FOOD ADDITIVES AMENDMENT OF 1958
Since a "food additive" is prima facie unsafe and must be pre-
tested according to the statutory procedure, the most important
question for the supplier of a substance intended to be added to
food is whether that substance is within the definition of "food
additive." Generally, section 201(s) 5 2 provides that a substance
intentionally3 added to food will be a "food additive" if, and only
Cir. 1953). Compare United States Cane Sugar Refiners Ass'n v. McNutt,
138 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1943), with A. E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. Secretary of
Agriculture, 120 F.2d 258 (7th Cir. 1941). See also American Lecithin Co.
v. McNutt, 155 F.2d 784 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 763 (1946); Land
O'Lakes Creameries, Inc. v. McNutt, 132 F.2d 653 (8th Cir. 1943).
51. Sections 409(g) (2), added by 72 Stat. 1788 (1958), 21 U.S.C. § 348
(g) (2) (Supp. I, 1960); 706(d) (4), added by 74 Stat. 403 (1960), 21
U.S.C. § 376(d) (4) (Supp. H, 1960). This is a new standard for judicial
review which replaces the previous standard of "substantial evidence on the
record as a whole." The House Committee felt that this provided a fairer
standard because it would restrain the court from upholding the Secretary's
order on the basis of isolated evidence, "which evidence in and of itself may
be considered substantial without taking account of contradictory evidence
of possible equal or even greater substance." H.R. REP. No. 2284, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1958).
52. Section 201(s) provides:
The term "food additive" means any substance the intended use of
which results or may reasonably be expected to result, directly or in-
directly, in its becoming a component or otherwise affecting the char-
acteristics of any food (including any substance intended for use in
producing, manufacturing, packing, processing, preparing, treating,
packaging, transporting, or holding food; and including any source of
radiation intended for any such use), if such substance is not generally
recognized, among experts qualified by scientific training and experi-
ence to evaluate its safety, as having been adequately shown through
scientific procedures (or, in the case of a substance used in food prior
to January 1, 1958, through either scientific procedures or experience
based on common use in food) to be safe under the conditions of its
intended use; except that such term does not include-(1) a pesticide chemical in or on a raw agricultural commodity; or
(2) a pesticide chemical to the extent that it is intended for use or
is used in the production, storage, or transportation of any raw agri-
cultural commodity; or
(3) a color additive; or(4) any substance used in accordance with a sanction or approval
granted prior to the enactment of this paragraph pursuant to this Act
or the Meat Inspection Act of March 4, 1907 (34 Stat. 1260), as
amended and extended (21 U.S.C. 71 and the following).
Section 201(s), added by 72 Stat. 1784 (1958), as amended, 21 U.S.C.
§ 321(s) (Supp. H, 1960).
53. Additives which accidentally get into food are covered by other
provisions in the basic act. 2 CCH FOOD DRUG CosM. L. REP. 3545
(1960) ; Rankin, Incidental Additives, 13 FooD DRUG CosM. L.J. 7 (1958).
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if (1) its use results, or may be reasonably expected to result, "in
its becoming a component or otherwise affecting the characteristics
of any food," and (2) it is not generally recognized among ex-
perts as safe ("GRAS")' under the conditions of its intended
use. It is immaterial for the purpose of this amendment whether
the substance is directly mixed in or put on the food (a "direct"
additive), or migrates to the food from packaging material (an
"indirect" or "incidental" additive)." The "grandfather clause"
in section 201 (s) excludes from the term "food additive" any
substances approved prior to the enactment of the Food Additives
Amendment pursuant to the basic act, the Poultry Products In-
spection Act, or the Meat Inspection Act. 6
But even if a substance qualifies as a "food additive," under
some circumstances, at least temporarily, the supplier will not be
required to establish its safety. The Secretary may on his own initi-
ative, as mentioned earlier, issue a regulation permitting the addi-
tive's use within certain appropriate restrictions. Also by regula-
tion, the Secretary may exempt from the Amendment's provisions,
products containing additives intended solely for investigation or
research purposes.5 7 Further, the FDA has published some lists
granting an extension of time to users to prove the safety of cer-
tain enumerated additives.
C. THE COLOR ADDITIVE AMENDMENT OF 1960
The Color Additive Amendment enacted on July 12, 1960,
utilizes the basic pattern set forth in the Food Additives Amend-
ment. It consists of a "permanent" law which amends the basic
act and a "temporary" law which in no way affects the basic
act." The "permanent" provisions will not become fully effective,
for most purposes, until two and one-half years after the Amend-
ment's enactment date. During this period the permanent provi-
54. See notes 65-71 infra and accompanying text. Substances used prior
to 1958 can be considered "GRAS" among experts on the basis of either
"common use in food," or "scientific procedures," whereas the experts may
only examine substances introduced in food after 1958 on the basis of
"scientific procedures." See note 52 supra. With respect to the FDA policy
regarding "common use in food," see 21 C.F.R. § 121.1(f) (Supp. 1961);
Food and Drug Administration Ansivers to Questions Submitted at Confer-
ence Cosponsered by Administration and FLI at Washington on Nov.
16-17, 1959, 15 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J 213, 217, 220 (1960).
55. See note 52 supra; 2 CCH FOOD DRUG CosM. L. REP. 3533 (1961).
56. Section 201(s) (4), added by 72 Stat. 1784 (1958), as amended, 74
Stat. 397, 21 U.S.C. § 321(s) (4) (Supp. II, 1960) (quoted note 52 supra).
57. Section 409(i), added by 72 Stat. 1788 (1958), 21 U.S.C. § 348
(Supp. II, 1960).
58. See 2 CCH FOOD DRUG COSM. L. REP. 3632 (1960).
sions govern only the use of "new" color additives.59 The "tem-
porary" provisions apply only to the previously authorized natural
and coal-tar colors. These provisions provide for the provisional
safe listing of these colors during the two and one-half year pe-
riod before the "permanent" provisions begin to regulate the use
of all "color additives."
The Amendment is generally considered a "relief measure" from
the inflexible rules which developed under the 1938 Act. It pur-
ports to liberalize the rules under which the use of a color in or
on foods, drugs, or cosmetics will be authorized, and to broaden
the scope of authorized uses. These objectives led to two important
changes in the basic act. First, and perhaps of most significance,
the definition of "color additive 6 results in a uniform applica-
tion of the Amendment to all colors.61 "Color additive" is de-
fined without reference to the term "coal-tar color" which elimi-
nates the distinction made in the 1938 Act between natural and
coal-tar colors. In addition, unlike the Food Additives Amend-
ment, this amendment contains no "GRAS" or "grandfather"
clause. Second, the Amendment removes color additives from the
food additives provisions62 and creates a new section 3 contain-
ing all the substantive and procedural rules for establishing the
safety of colors whether used in foods, drugs, or cosmetics.
59. The two and one-half year period may be either lengthened or short-
ened at the Secretary's discretion. Color Additives Amendments of 1960,
74 Stat. 404; 2 CCH FOOD DRUG COSM. L. RP. 3620, 3633 (1960).
60.
The term "color additive" means a material which-(A) is a dye, pigment, or other substance made by a process of
synthesis or similar artifice, or extracted, isolated or otherwise de-
rived, with or without intermediate or final change of identity, from
a vegetable, animal, mineral, or other source, and(B) when added or applied to a food, drug, or cosmetic, or to
the human body or any part thereof, is capable (alone or through
reaction with other substances) of imparting color thereto; except
that such term does not include any material which the Secretary,
by regulation, determines is used (or intended to be used) solely
for a purpose or purposes other than coloring.
Section 201(t), added by 74 Stat. 397, 21 U.S.C. § 321 (Supp. II, 1960).
61. See notes 26-28 supra and accompanying text.
62. Section 201(s) (3), added by 74 Stat. 397, 21 U.S.C. § 321 (Supp.
II, 1960).
63. Section 706, added by 74 Stat. 399 (1960), 21 U.S.C. § 376 (Supp.
II, 1960). The function of the Secretary, with respect to approving addi-
tives, is not the same under the two amendments largely because of the
wider scope of the Color Additive Amendment. He may list a color additive,
with appropriate tolerances and other restrictions, as safe (1) for use gen-
erally in all foods, drugs, and cosmetics; (2) for general use with a limited
group of products (e.g., just drugs); or (3) for a limited use (e.g., for ex-
ternal use only). Note, however, that an additive must be listed separately
for use in each of the three types of products: foods, drugs, and cosmetics.
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M. TWO PROBLEM AREAS
While the interpretation and administration of these amend-
ments has resulted in many problems, two areas seem to merit
special attention. The first concerns how far the definition of
"food additive" can be extended. The other problem concerns
the FDA's strict application of the controversial Delaney antican-
cer clause. In both areas the debate takes place between industry
which is seeking to protect its earning capacity and the FDA which
is seeking to secure more adequate protection for the consumer.
An example of this conflict in interests was seen earlier in the
discussion of the "harmless per se" principle developed by the
FDA when administering the 1938 Act.6" Under the Amend-
ments industry has been more sensitive than the FDA to the prac-
tical difficulties encountered in achieving the objectives of the
Amendments and has hesitated to meet these objectives when a
change, even though feasible, in the existing pattern of production
and marketing is required. The FDA, on the other hand, occa-
sionally seems to disregard the practical difficulties created by its
demands for literal compliance with the statutory provisions.
A. WHICH SUBSTANCES ARE STATUTORY ADDITIVES?
1. The "GRAS" Clause in the Food Additives Amendment
The "GRAS" clause exempts from the Food Additives Amend-
ment any substance having the requisite characteristics of a "food
additive" if it is
generally recognized, among experts qualified by scientific training
and experience to evaluate its safety, as having been adequately shown
through scientific procedures . .. to be safe under the conditions of
its intended use .... 65
Substances already deemed "GRAS" appear on the "white list"
which is published and continually supplemented by the FDA.6
Probably because "GRAS" represents a possible method of avoid-
ing the Amendment's pretesting requirements, few have chal-
lenged the clause itself. The FDA's administration of this clause,
however, has received continued criticism from various elements
64. See notes 29-40 supra and accompanying text.
65. Section 201(s), added by 72 Stat. 1784 (1958), as amended, 21
U.S.C. § 321(s) (Supp. II, 1960) (quoted note 52 supra). See also note
54 supra and accompanying text. Those qualifying as experts must have
training and experience in the general areas of biology, medicine, pharmacol-
ogy, physiology, toxicology, and veterinary medicine. 21 C.F.R. § 121.3(e)
(Supp. 1961).
66. 21 .C.F.R. § 121.101 (Supp. 1961).
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of industry.67 To determine which substances are "GRAS," the
FDA consults through correspondence a group of about 800 ex-
perts. When these experts are in substantial agreement as to the
safety of a substance, it is deemed "GRAS" and placed on the
"white list."6 This resort to 800 experts is challenged as being
not only inefficient because of the time required to evaluate 800
diversified replies,69 but also unauthorized by the language of the
"GRAS" clause.
Some writers have urged that the FDA should consult, in most
cases, a group of experts much smaller than 800. The food addi-
tives "GRAS" clause allows the FDA to permit the use of a sub-
stance without pretesting if it is generally recognized as safe among
"experts qualified . . . to evaluate its safety." This language
suggests that for each substance under consideration the FDA must
consult only those experts who have already tested and studied
that substance. It is argued that a comparison of the food addi-
tives "GRAS" clause with the "GRAS" clauses in the Pesticide
Chemicals Amendment (adopted in 1954) and the "new drug"
provision (adopted in 1938), both part of the basic act, supports
this conclusion. These latter two clauses only require that the ex-
perts be qualified generally to "evaluate the safety of pesticide
chemicals" and to "evaluate the safety of drugs"; they do not re-
quire the experts to be specifically qualified to "evaluate its safe-
ty." Since the legislative history shows no congressional intent to
have the food additives "GRAS" clause administered as the FDA
has administered the other two "GRAS" clauses, it is argued that
this difference in language manifests a congressional intention to
apply a different administrative policy to food additives. Hence
the FDA could properly consult 800 experts under the Pesticide
Chemicals Amendment or the "new drug" provision, but not under
the Food Additives Amendment.70
67. See, e.g., Becker, The GRAS Clause of the Food-Additives Amend-
ment, 15 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 444 (1960); Hutchings, The Food-Addi-
tives Amendment As Seen By the Technologist, 15 FOOD DRuG CosM.
L.J. 17 (1960); Oser, Current Problems Posed by the Food-Additives
Amendment, 14 FooD DRUG CosM. L.J. 574 (1959).
68. 2 CCH FOOD DRUG COSM. L. REP. 3542 (1960). In Merritt Corp. v.
Folsom, 165 F. Supp. 418 (D.D.C. 1958), the court interpreted the
"GRAS" clause in the drug provision of the basic act. It held that when-
ever there was a genuine difference of opinion among the experts as to a
drug's safety, it was not "GRAS." No cases interpreting this clause in the
Food Additives Amendment have been discovered.
69. See Hutchings, supra note 67; Hall, Flavor Additives and the Food-
Additives Amendment, 15 FooD DRUG CosM. L.J., 24, 28-30 (1960); Oser,
supra note 67.
70. See Becker, supra note 67; see also Mulford, Some Vexing Problems
of Additives Under the New Law, 15 FooD DRUG CosM. L.J. 10, 11-12(1960).
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Notwithstanding these arguments, the FDA appears to have
adopted a sound procedure for administering the food additives
"GRAS" clause. Since a scientist can possess sufficient expertise
to evaluate a substance without being previously familiar with
that substance, the difference in language between the three
"GRAS" clauses is not necessarily significant. The Amendments'
policy of providing increased consumer protection seems to favor
the consultation of a large group of experts because the use of
more experts may increase the reliability of their composite judg-
ment."' Where only a few experts are familiar with the specific
properties of a questionable substance, it is not "GRAS." The
Amendment does not contemplate the clearance of largely un-
known additives through the "GRAS" clause.
2. Incidental Additives under the Food Additives Amendment
The Food Additives Amendment applies equally to "direct"
additives (those directly mixed with or put on food) and "indi-
rect" or "incidental" additives (substances which actually migrate
to food from packaging and other materials). 7 The Amend-
ment's effect on the suppliers of these additives has, however, been
unequal. Its application to incidental additives has given rise to
many problems not encountered by suppliers of direct additives.
Most of the difficulty seems to stem from the FDA's unwilling-
ness to adopt a more flexible administrative policy with respect to
incidental additives.
The pretesting requirements of the Food Additives Amendment
often pose a particularly onerous burden for the packaging in-
dustry because ordinarily only minute quantities of additives ac-
tually migrate to the food product. The packager is responsible
not only for the actual "migrants," but also for the substances sub-
sequently formed on or in the food as a result of the migration.
The packager's problem is made more complex by the statutory
requirement that a petition for the approval of an additive is in-
sufficient if it fails to contain "a description of the practicable
methods for determining the quantity" of the additive in ques-
tion.7 While it may be difficult to ascertain which substances in
fact migrate to the food, it is often impossible to devise tests sensi-
tive enough to determine the quantity of the additive migrating,
71. The justification for the "GRAS" clause itself depends upon this
assumption.
72. See note 52 supra; 2 CCH FOOD DRUG CosM. L. REP. 3533
(1961).
73. Section 409(b) (1) (D), added by 72 Stat. 1785 (1958), 21 U.S.C.
§ 348(b)(1) (D) (1958).
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the nature of the substance subsequently formed, and the quantity
of that second substance.74
But the difficulties created by the Amendment's application to
incidental additives are not limited to suppliers of these additives,
they are also reflected in the administration of the Amendment.
Initially Congress was primarily concerned with regulating the
use of direct additives. Yet petitions for the approval of incidental
additives has occupied more of the FDA's time than petitions re-
questing the approval of direct additives.75
It has been frequently suggested that exempting minute quanti-
ties of incidental additives from the Amendment's pretesting re-
quirements (a "de minimis" exception) would avoid many of the
difficulties which result from regulating the use of packaging ma-
terials. This proposal, which would minimize testing problems for
industry and the FDA, would treat additives present in amounts
below an established tolerance level as having a concentration of
zero.76 The FDA insists, however, that the language of the statute
will not permit a "de minimis" exception77 principally because
minute quantities of some additives can be lethal. The FDA also
argues that since the statute forbids the use of all substances not
"GRAS" or otherwise exempt by regulation, the "de minimis" ex-
ception would result in the issuance of regulations which could not
be practicably enforced. The FDA would not be furnished with
practical methods for detection of incidental additives if small
quantities could be disregarded by industry during pretesting.
Even if the FDA position is compelled by the language of the
Amendment, there are several reasons why a "de minimis" excep-
74. See Nelson, Incidental Additives to Food: Have We Made a Prudent
Judgment?, 16 FOOD DRUG CosM. LJ. 597, 600-05 (1961); Hall, supra
note 69, at 30-31; Mulford, supra note 70, at 14-15; Kaufman, Food
Packaging and the 1958 Food-Additives Amendment, 14 FOOD DRUG COSM.
L.J. 649 (1959); Oser, supra note 67.
No attempt is made here to describe all the testing problems facing the
packaging industry. It might be noted, however, that even those packagers
not intentionally utilizing unknown substances in their product may be sub-
ject to the amendment. These processors must grapple with the difficult
problem of proving that no migration occurs. Miller, The Effect of the
Food Law on Packaging Materials, 17 FooD DRUG CosM. L.J. 38, 40(1962).
75. Nelson, supra note 74, at 599-600.
76. See, e.g., Oser, supra note 67, at 577-80; NATIONAL RESEARCH
COUNCIL, FOOD PROTECTION COMMITTEE, FOOD AND NUTRITION BOARD,
PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES FOR EvALUATING THE SAFETY OF FOOD AD-
DITIVES 8-9 (1959).
77. See Kirk, Safety of Packaging Materials, 15 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J.
263 (1960); Rankin, Incidental Food Additives, 14 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J.
768 (1959); Checchi, Food-Additives Procedures and Policies, 14 FOOD
DRUG CosM. L.J. 591 (1959).
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tion or something similar should be provided either by the FDA
administratively, or by a change in the Amendment. The dispute
between industry and the FDA appears to be largely factual. The
FDA insists on strict application of the Amendment on the ground
that any quantity of a migrating substance may be lethal. Indus-
try, doubting whether the ordinarily low concentrations of pack-
aging migrants are ever lethal, argues that even though this possi-
bility exists the administrative policy should take into account the
difficulty of detecting these substances. Until this factual dispute
is resolved to the contrary, it seems at least arguable that at some
point the cost resulting from strict compliance with the pretesting
requirements by the packaging supplier will be out of proportion
to the protection secured for the consumer.7 This cost may also
be out of proportion to whatever advantage can be gained through
the use of the questionable packaging material. Where this is the
case the supplier may elect either to discontinue the use of certain
products or to use them in disregard of the statutory mandate. The
consumer stands to lose either way. He may be denied the use of
beneficial products or his health may be jeopardized by untested
products.
B. ThE DELANEY ANTICANCER CLAUSE
Easily the most controversial provision of the additives leg-
islation is the Delaney anticancer clause. This provision, which
is found in both Amendments, 9 forbids the Secretary to approve
78. Cf. Nelson, supra note 74.
79.
... [No additive shall be deemed to be safe if it is found to in-
duce cancer when ingested by man or animal, or if it is found, after
tests which are appropriate for the evaluation of the safety of food
additives, to induce cancer in man or animal;
Food Additives Amendment of 1958, added by 72 Stat. 1786, 21 U.S.C.
§ 348(c) (3) (A) (Supp. II, 1960).
A color additive (i) shall be deemed unsafe, and shall not be listed,
for any use which will or may result in ingestion of all or part of
such additive, if the additive is found by the Secretary to induce can-
cer when ingested by man or animal, or if it is found by the Secretary,
after tests which are appropriate for the evaluation of the safety of
additives for use in food, to induce cancer in man or animal, and (ii)
shall be deemed unsafe, and shall not be listed, for any use which will
not result in ingestion of any part of such additive, if, after tests
which are appropriate for the evaluation of the safety of additives for
such use, or after other relevant exposure of man or animal to such
additive, it is found by the Secretary to induce cancer in man or
animal.
(C) (i) In any proceeding for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of
a regulation listing a color additive, whether commenced by a pro-
posal of the Secretary on his own initiative or by a proposal contained
in a petition, the petitioner, or any other person who will be adverse-
ly affected by such proposal or by the Secretary's order . . . may
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the use of any additive if, on the basis either of experience or
reliable experiments, it is shown to induce cancer. The one differ-
ence between the two Amendments with respect to this clause is
important only when it is invoked against a petition. The Color
Additives Amendment allows the petitioner to request a review of
his petition by an ad hoc expert advisory committee."0 A similar
provision was eliminated from the Food Additives Amendment
shortly before its passage.8"
As in other controversial areas under the two Amendments,
most of the criticism of the anticancer clause is leveled at its inter-
pretation and administration by the FDA. In interpreting this
clause the FDA takes the position, not inconsistent with the lan-
guage of the clause, that it is an absolute prohibition of carcino-
genic (cancer inducing) substances. 2 Thus, substances found to
induce cancer will be barred regardless of the concentration re-
quired to induce the disease. In administering the anticancer
clause, however, the FDA appears to have strained even this inter-
pretation. For several types of additives the FDA seems to require
proof of non-carcinogenicity."3 The statute appears to prohibit
the use of additives which in fact induce cancer; 4 it contains no
prohibition of additives which might induce cancer. Also, the FDA
appears to have adopted a strained interpretation of the word "in-
duce." For example, there are reports that an additive which causes
gall stones in test rats will be prohibited under the clause because
request . . . that the petition or order thereon, or the Secretary's pro-
posal, be referred to an advisory committee for a report and recom-
mendations with respect to any matter arising under subparagraph
(B) of this paragraph, which is involved in such proposal or order
and which requires the exercise of scientific judgment ...
Color Additive Amendments of 1960, § 706(b) (5) (B), added by 74 Stat.
400, 21 U.S.C. § 376(b) (5) (B) (Supp. II, 1960).
80. Section 706(b)(5)(C), added by 74 Stat. 400 (1960), 21 U.S.C.§ 376(b) (5)(C) (Supp. II, 1960) (partially quoted note 79 supra).
81. Becker, The Scientific Advisory Committee and the Administration
of Color Additives, 15 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 801, 802-03 (1960); Oser,
Recent Developments on the Food-Additives Front, 14 FOOD DRUG COSM.
L.J. 254, 257-58 (1959). Many argue that a provision of this nature should
now be added to the Food Additives Amendment. See, e.g., Gordon, Prob-
lems Involved with the Administration of the Food-Additives Amendment,
15 FooD DRUG CosM. L.J. 777, 786 (1960).
82. This interpretation may well be the "plain meaning" of the clause.
See note 79 supra. Yet, since the "safety in use" principle pervades both
amendments, it might be argued that the Secretary may issue tolerance
levels even for the use of carcinogens. Certainly the language does not
preclude such an interpretation.
83. See Matson, Scientific Judgment in Law and Regulation, 15 FoOD
DRuG CosM. L.J. 70, 77-78 (1960).
84. See note 79 supra.
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the gall stones irritate the rats' gallbladders and thereby cause tu-
mors.
85
For a number of reasons, many argue that the anticancer clause
should be repealed. 8 As administered by the FDA, this clause
refutes a basic policy objective of the Amendment-the "safety
in use" principle. Only the Color Additives Amendment, with its
provision for referral to an ad hoc committee,8" leaves room for
the exercise of scientific judgment. But since the FDA will bar
any concentration of a carcinogen, the scientists will have little
opportunity to exercise discretion even under the Color Additive
Amendment procedure. Moreover, the clause is not conducive to
efficient, predictable administration. Experts disagree as to the
distinction between benign and malignant growths. There is no ac-
cepted definition of cancer. Also, there are no known practical,
reliable methods for discovering carcinogenic substances.
In response, the FDA points out that since very little is known
about cancer and there are no known tolerance levels any error
should be made on the side of increased protection. s8 However,
of all the suspected sources of cancer, the evidence gathered to in-
dict food or color additives is the weakest."9 The exact causes of
many dangerous diseases are not established, but the statute only
gives cancer special treatment.
A reasonable compromise between the FDA and the advocates
of repeal of the anticancer clauses might permit the FDA to issue
tolerances90 for at least those carcinogens with known threshold
levels. Some of the legislative history of this clause supports this
construction. When the Food Additives Amendment was passed,
many Congressmen who were aware of the "safety in use" prin-
ciple thought that the Amendment's effect would be the same
with or without the Delaney clause.91 Since the "safety in use"
principle pervades both Amendments and permits the use of no
additive which is dangerous under the conditions of its intended
use there seems to be no need to isolate carcinogens.
85. See Oser, Current Problems Posed by the Food-Additives Amend-
ment, 14 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 574, 581-82 (1959).
86. See, e.g., Oser, Modern Technology as Related to the Safety of
Foods, 15 FooD DRuG CosM. L.J. 586 (1960); Oser, supra note 85; cf.
Hagan, The Food-Additives Amendment-Its Effect on Veterinary Drugs
and Feed, 15 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J 117 (1960); Ringuette, Medicated
Animal Feeds Under Food-Additives Amendment of 1958: A Case Study,
15 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 320 (1960).
87. See notes 80 & 81 supra.
88. See 2 CCH FOOD DRUG CosM. L. REP. 3648 (1960).
89. See Oser, supra note 85, at 581.
90. Cf. Depew, Problems of Food Additive Regulation, 16 FOOD DRUG
CosM. L.J. 253 (1961); Matson, supra note 83.
91. S. REP. No. 2422, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1958).
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CONCLUSION
The long overdue Food and Color Additive Amendments make
two significant alterations in the basic act. First, the burden of
proof was shifted; industry is now required to pretest. Second, the
"safety in use" principle was adopted; this permitted industry to
exploit many additives previously unavailable because they were
prohibited under the "harmless per se" concept. Yet the additive
problem continues to warrant congressional scrutiny. Congress
might now examine this legislation with a view toward simplifying
its administration. The application of' the "GRAS" clause, for ex-
ample, might be restricted. The present practice of consulting 800
experts may prove unwieldy. Congress might also reconsider the
all-inclusive "food additive" definition in light of the incidental
additive problem. Finally, the administration of the anticancer
clauses makes these provisions inconsistent with the basic objec-
tives of the additives legislation; if these clauses are retained, they
should be altered to incorporate the "safety in use" principle.
